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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the individual outcomes of irrational thinking, including 
paranormality and non-scientific thinking. These modes of thinking are identified by 
factor analysis from a 2008 survey. Income and happiness are used as measures of 
performance. Empirical results reveal that non-scientific thinking lowers income, 
whereas paranormality does not affect it. While non-scientific thinking lowers 
happiness, paranormality raises it. Extending the model, we find that higher ability and 
self-control result in higher income and happiness. Selfishness raises income, but 
diminishes happiness. These results suggest that Homo economicus generally achieves 
higher individual performance, except that belief in paranormality raises happiness.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims to discover how irrationality affects the performance (income and 
happiness) of human beings.  
Rationality is the essential assumption of traditional economics, meaning that 
agents act in a self-interested fashion given their constraints. In addition to rationality 
the following elements are commonly ascribed to “Homo economicus”: unlimited 
cognitive resources, pure self-interest, and perfect self-control. However, this is not the 
only possible description of economic agents; Homo economicus is often simply 
adopted for modeling convenience. Therefore, it is interesting to ask: “Does Homo 
economicus exhibit performance that is superior to real-world human beings?” In this 
paper, we focus on the effect of irrationality on performance, although we also 
investigate the impact of the other characteristics of Homo economicus.1    
The consequences of irrationality have been studied in the field of behavioral 
finance. DeLong et al. (1990) analyzed the efficiency of a financial market that consists 
of a mix of rational and irrational agents, and showed that this market can be inefficient 
if irrational agents comprise a substantial fraction of the market participants.2 The result 
                                                  
1 Konow and Earley (2008), based on their dictator game experiment, found that more generous 
people report greater happiness. 
2 The authors assume that rational agents are risk averse, which restricts them from making an 
unlimited arbitrage.  
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suggests that whether or not irrationality leads to lower profitability depends on the total 
number of irrational agents in the market. If irrational agents dominate, behaving 
irrationally in concordance with many other irrational agents can be profitable.  
Shumway and Wu (2006) empirically analyzed the Shanghai stock exchange and 
found that traders who show the disposition effect earn less profit. Barber and Odean 
(2001) showed that men transact too often because of their overconfidence, leading to 
low profitability. These empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
irrationality reduces profitability. 
We consider the core of rationality to consist of logical thinking, which is the 
unique tool by which human beings identify the appropriate actions to achieve their 
goals. We measure individuals’ degree of logical thinking by assessing the degree to 
which they believe in science and the degree to which they believe in paranormal 
phenomena. Although these may seem to be two sides of the same coin, they actually 
have different characteristics, as will be demonstrated in section 2. 3  While 
paranormality has not often been analyzed in the economics literature, there have been 
many studies on this topic in the field of psychology. However, the relationship between 
paranormal beliefs and individual success has, to our knowledge, not yet been studied.  
                                                  
3 Lindeman and Aarnio (2007) offer some support for this; they report that superstition is well 
predicted by ontological confusion, but not by analytical thinking. 
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The majority of Japanese people do not believe in any religion: according to our 
large scale-survey, 56% answered “None” to the question “Please indicate if you are 
affiliated with any of the following religions.” Also, 58.5% answered “It doesn’t hold 
true at all” to the statement “I am deeply religious;” those who answered “It is 
particularly true” comprised only 3.4%. Nonetheless, belief in paranormal phenomena is 
popular, especially for the younger generation, as in many countries (Williams 2007, 
Rice 2003, Peltzer 2003). Thus, belief in paranormal phenomena in Japan, especially 
among younger individuals, may not stem from religious beliefs, but from superstitions 
spread by mass media.4  
We assess an individual’s performance with two measures: 1) income, and 2) 
happiness. Success in the world is often evaluated by income, assets, and social status; 
attainment of these goals is largely determined by physical laws, although chance also 
plays a large role. On the other hand, human beings also pursue subjective happiness, 
which is strongly affected by one’s mental condition. Indeed, Wills (2009) reported that 
higher satisfaction with spirituality and religiosity brings about significantly higher 
well-being (see also Cohen 2002). Although happiness depends on income to some 
degree, the two may sometimes diverge. Thus, we investigate how paranormality and 
                                                  
4 Fortunetelling based on blood types or horoscopes is broadcasted daily on many Japanese TV 
channels. 
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non-scientific thinking affect both income and happiness.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we explain the 
data and methods used. In section 3, we present the basic results and check robustness. 
In section 4, we extend the basic model to examine how characteristics of Homo 
economicus other than rational thinking affect performance. Section 5 concludes.     
 
2.  Data and methods 
In this section, we explain our dataset and report the results of a preliminary analysis 
regarding the origins of belief in paranormality and non-scientific thinking. 
 
2.1 The questionnaire survey 
All data used in this paper were obtained from a survey conducted by the COE (Center 
of Excellence) project of Osaka University in February 2008. Three thousand and forty 
eight (3,048) people aged 20-75 were selected from all over Japan by double stratified 
random sampling. Selected respondents were visited at their homes and handed the 
questionnaire. Several days later, completed questionnaires were picked up. Two 
thousand seven hundred and thirty one (2,731) questionnaires were returned (response 
rate of 89.6%). At the same time, 3000 individuals were randomly chosen from all over 
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Japan, and the same questionnaire was sent by postal mail to these. One thousand two 
hundred and eighty seven (1,287) of these were returned (response rate of 42.9%). In 
this paper, these two samples are pooled and used for the analysis, so that the total 
number of observation is 4,018. 
 
2.2 Questions associated with irrationality 
We designed questions that elicit an individual’s degree of belief in paranormality 
(henceforth “paranormality”) and non-scientific thinking; we collectively refer to these 
two measures as “irrationality.” Paranormality is assessed with eight questions and 
non-scientific thinking with three; these questions are listed in Table 1. Each response is 
on a five-point scale. 
The standard questions used to measure paranormality, the Paranormal Belief 
Scale (PBS), were developed by Tobacyk and Milford (1983) and are widely used 
(Hergovich and Arendasy 2005, Aarnio and Lindeman 2005, Dagnall et al. 2007, 
Peltzer 2003). These authors propose a 25-item questionnaire based on the results from 
factor analysis of a 61-item pool. Factor analysis revealed seven independent 
dimensions comprising belief in the paranormal. Out of our eight questions on 
paranormality, four are related to factor 1 in Tobacyk and Milford, one belongs to factor 
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2, and one to factor 7. Thus, our questions are somewhat similar to those in Tobacyk 
and Milford. However, Wiseman and Watt (2004) criticize the PBS, pointing out “this 
scale refers solely to negative superstitions (e.g., breaking a mirror will cause bad luck) 
and omits items referring to positive superstitions (e.g., carrying a lucky charm will 
bring good luck).” Another measure, the Belief in Paranormal Scale (BIP), has been 
proposed, which assesses both paranormal beliefs and experiences (Thalbourne and 
Delin 1993, Rattert and Bursik 2001). Williams et al. (2006) and Rice (2003) each 
propose their own measures. In sum, although the PBS is the most common measure 
used to assess paranormal beliefs, there exist a variety of alternatives. 
From Table 1, we can see that belief in paranormality and non-scientific thinking 
are predominant. Except for the question regarding “Human beings evolved from other 
living things,” the modal response is in the middle of the 5-point scale. Though the 
number of responses indicating non-belief in science is a minority, the distribution of 
the answer is almost symmetric for the questions on the existence of gods, heaven, 
ghosts, and the afterlife. Many answered “true” for questions such as “God or gods exist” 
“Life after death exists,” and “God knows about all the wrong things we’ve done.”  
 
2.3 Factor analysis 
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We asked eleven questions concerning irrationality. Needless to say, irrationality is not 
the sole determinant of the answers to these questions. Therefore we performed a factor 
analysis on the set of eleven questions.5  
The results of that factor analysis are presented in Table 2. It is clear that the first 
factor has a large loading on the eight questions associated with paranormalilty, while 
the second factor strongly relates to the three questions associated with non-scientific 
thinking. We therefore name the first factor PARANORMAL and the second 
NONSCIENTIFIC.  
 
2.4 Where do belief in paranormality and non-scientific thinking come from? 
In this subsection we examine how paranormality and non-scientific thinking emerge. 
We particularly focus on the effect of the respondents’ childhood environments.   
We define the average years of schooling of a respondent’s parents as 
EDUCTION_P.6 We hypothesize that higher parental education directly and indirectly 
leads to children thinking more rationally. Another variable is standard of living at age 
15 (LIVING_15), which ranges from 0 (poorest) to 10 (wealthiest). Although the 
direction of the effect on rationality is not intuitively obvious, we hypothesize that 
                                                  
5 Specifically, we use principal factor analysis (PFA) with promax rotation. 
6 When respondents have only one parent, the variable is defined as the schooling years of that 
parent. 
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growing up with hardship will discipline children and keep them from subscribing to 
irrationality, other thing being equal. Another important variable is intelligence, which, 
we hypothesize, increases rationality. We proxy for intelligence with a respondent’s 
self-reported grades (averaged across all academic subjects) at the age of 15 
(ABILITY).7  
Gender may play an important role, because boys and girls are often educated to 
behave differently and to seek different life goals. We include a dummy variable DMAN, 
which takes on a value of unity for males and zero for females. Age may represent 
generation, which could reflect the degree to which the media reported on paranormal 
phenomena when that generation was young; alternatively, belief in paranormality 
might depend on age itself. Thus, we add age decade dummies (e.g. D_AGE20 is a 
dummy representing whether a respondent is in his or her 20s) to the regression. The 
dummy for 70s is deleted as the benchmark. 
Estimation results by ordinary least squares (OLS) are presented in Table 3. 
Factors influencing paranormality appear on the left. Females tend to have stronger 
belief in paranormality than males, which is consistent with previous studies (Rice 2003, 
                                                  
7 Musch and Ehrenberg (2002) used grades in junior high school as a proxy for cognitive ability 
and examined the correlation with paranormality. 
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Wolfradt 1997, Wiseman and Watt 2004, Williams et al. 2007).8 Paranormality tends to 
be strongest when respondents are in their 40s. Those who had higher grades at age 15 
tend to exhibit less paranormality, as do those whose parents are more educated. 
Interestingly, a higher childhood standard of living is associated with more 
paranormality.    
Results regarding non-scientific thinking are shown in the right-hand columns. 
The results are similar to those for paranormality. The only differences are that 
childhood standard of living is not significant, and that non-scientific thinking decreases 
monotonically with age. This last result presents an interesting contrast with the result 
for paranormality. Respondents in their 40s were teenagers around 1978, when 
paranormal phenomena (spoon-bending by Uri Geller and Kokkuri-san, a kind of 
table-turning, etc.) were very popular in the media. Therefore, we might be seeing a 
generational effect.    
 
2.5 Income and happiness as measures of life performance  
We use two measures of an agent’s life performance: income and happiness. The former 
is a purely economic measure of performance, while the latter is psychological and 
                                                  
8  However, Peltzer (2003) finds no significant gender differences among secondary and 
university students in South Africa. 
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self-evaluative. 2007 pretax income (on a 12-point scale) is included as a question in the 
survey. Following Barsky et al. (1997), we fit a lognormal distribution to the income 
histogram and estimate the income for each class; this estimation result is called 
INCOME.  
HAPPINESS is defined by the answer to the following question: Overall, how 
happy would you say you are currently? Using a scale from 0 - 10 where “10” is 
“very happy” and “0” is “very unhappy”, how would you rate you current level of 
happiness?  
  
2.6 Statistical analysis 
We regress the performance variables, INCOME and HAPPINESS, on the variables 
representing irrationality, PARANORMAL and NONSCIENTIFIC, and on other control 
variables. Because males tend to earn higher incomes than females, we include the 
dummy variable DMAN. In Japan, wage rates are often tied to age; therefore, we add the 
variables of age (AGE) and its square (AGE_SQ).9  
Thus, the regression equation for INCOME is: 
ܫܰܥܱܯܧ௜ ൌ a଴ ൅ aଵܲܣܴܣܱܴܰܯܣܮ௜ ൅ aଶܱܰܰܵܥܫܧܰܶܫܨܫܥ௜ ൅ aଷܦܯܣ ௜ܰ ൅
                                                  
9 We also estimated a specification using age dummies instead of age and its square. However, 
the results are almost identical. 
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aସܣܩܧ௜ ൅ aହܣܩܧ_ܵܳ௜ ൅ ߝ௜      (1), 
where i indexes individuals and ߝ௜ is a disturbance term. Equation (1) is estimated by 
OLS. However, the inclusion of the male dummy variable may cause a problem. Since 
females tend to be more paranormal, the dummy may be collinear with PARANORMAL. 
Therefore we also estimate a variant of equation (1) on male-only and female-only 
subsamples.   
Since it is well known that happiness depends on gender and age (Frey and Stutzer 
2002), we add these variables to the regression equation for HAPPINESS: 
ܪܽ݌݌݅݊݁ݏݏ௜ ൌ b଴ ൅ bଵܲܣܴܣܱܴܰܯܣܮ௜ ൅ bଶܱܰܰܵܥܫܧܰܶܫܨܫܥ௜ ൅ bଷܦܯܣ ௜ܰ ൅
bସܣܩܧ௜ ൅ bହܣܩܧ_ܵܳ௜ ൅ ߝ௜      (2) 
It is also known that subjective happiness depends on income in cross sectional 
analyses (Frey and Stutzer 2002). Thus, we estimate a variant of equation (2) that 
includes income: 
ܪܽ݌݌݅݊݁ݏݏ௜ ൌ b଴ ൅ bଵܲܣܴܣܱܴܰܯܣܮ௜ ൅ bଶܱܰܰܵܥܫܧܰܶܫܨܫܥ௜ ൅ bଷܦܯܣ ௜ܰ ൅
bସܣܩܧ௜ ൅ bହܣܩܧ_ܵܳ௜ ൅ b଺ܫܰܥܱܯܧ௜ ൅ ߝ௜        (3) 
We must be careful regarding the interpretation of the estimation results for 
equation (3): b1 and b2 represent the direct effects of irrationality, but even if b1 and b2 
are found to be statistically insignificant, these variables may indirectly affect 
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HAPPINESS through INCOME. Equations (2) and (3) are estimated by ordered probit, 
since HAPPINESS is an ordered variable. In addition, in order to compare the 
magnitude of direct and indirect effects, we conduct a path estimation.    
   
3.  Estimation results  
3.1 Effect of irrationality on income 
The estimation results for equation (1) are presented in Table 4. On the left are shown 
the results when income is regressed over only the key variables, PARANORMAL and 
NONSCIENTIFIC. Both coefficients are significantly negative, implying that 
paranormal and non-scientific thinking lowers economic performance.  
In the right columns, estimates for equation (1) are presented. The coefficient on 
non-scientific thinking is negative and significant. The maleness dummy, DMAN, is 
significantly positive, as expected. Age and squared age are also significant, and are 
positive and negative respectively, implying that income peaks at age 48. The 
coefficient on PARANORMAL is insignificant.  
In order to check if belief in paranormality affects income independent of gender, 
we estimate equation (1) for single-gender subsamples. The results for males are similar 
to the total sample; whereas NONSCIENTIFIC is significantly negative, 
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PARANORMAL is negative but insignificant (p-value = 0.266, results not shown). On 
the other hand, for the female-only subsample, most of the coefficients are not 
significant, suggesting that the specification is not adequate to explain female income. It 
is not easy to explain how female earnings are determined: for example, marital status 
and income of husband (if married) may strongly affect how much a woman earns. The 
result that PARANORMAL is not significant for either gender suggests that income may 
not depend on belief in paranormality.  
In sum, controlling for gender, we have a robust result that non-scientific thinking 
lowers income, while there is no clear evidence that belief in paranormality has any 
effect on income. 
 
3.2 Effect of irrationality on happiness 
Estimation results for equation (2) (the HAPPINESS regression) are presented in panel 
A of Table 5. The left-hand columns show the results when only the two key 
explanatory variables are included. Interestingly enough, the coefficient on 
PARANORMAL is positive here, indicating that those who believe in paranormal 
phenomena are happier, while the coefficient on NONSCIENTIFIC is significantly 
negative, implying that non-scientific thinking lowers happiness. This result highlights 
14 
 
the substantial functional difference between belief in paranormality and non-scientific 
thinking. 
In the right columns, results for the full specification of equation (2) are shown. 
Once again, the coefficients of the two key variables, PARANORMAL and 
NONSCIENTIFIC, are significantly positive and negative, respectively. Age and 
squared age are not significant at all.  
In panel B of Table 5, we present the results of equation (3), where INCOME is 
added to equation (2). While the coefficient on INCOME is highly significant as 
expected, the coefficients on PANRANORMAL and NONSCIENTIFIC are almost 
unchanged from panel A. The coefficient on DMAN becomes larger and age and 
squared age become significant, indicating that the happiness function is U-shaped in 
age, consistent with many previous studies (Clark 2007).10 We should note that the 
coefficients of PARANORMAL and NONSCIENTIFIC in panel B represent their direct 
effect on happiness; they have also an indirect effect through income.  
 In order to compare the magnitude of direct and indirect effects, we conducted a 
path estimation. The results are shown in Figure 1. Here, we assume that paranormality 
and non-scientific thinking are affected by gender and age, that income is affected by all 
                                                  
10 The results using age dummies indicate that happiness is lowest during people’s 50s. 
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four of these variables, and that happiness depends on these four and income. The figure 
reveals that income is influenced by non-scientific thinking, but not by paranormality, 
and that happiness is influenced by both (with opposite signs). This confirms the results 
shown in Tables 4 and 5. Looking at standardized coefficients, the indirect influence of 
non-scientific thinking on happiness through income appears to be much smaller than 
the direct influence.   
 
3.3 Robustness check: Alternative measures for PANRANORMAL and 
NONSCIENTIFIC  
In this subsection, we check the robustness of the results presented in the previous 
subsections. In particular, we check if the results remain unchanged when alternative 
measures for paranormality and non-scientific thinking are used. 
Previous studies have examined the relationship between religious and paranormal 
beliefs (Williams et al. 2006, Rice 2003, Smith and Simmonds 2006). Education is also 
believed to relate to paranormal beliefs (Aarnio and Lindeman 2005, Peltzer 2003). 
Thus, it may be reasonable to include attitudes towards religion (RELIGION) and 
education level (EDUCATION) in our set of raw outcome variables, from which 
paranormality and non-scientific thinking are extracted by factor analysis. Specifically, 
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RELIGION is defined as a survey respondent’s agreement with the statement “I am 
deeply religious,” and EDUCATION is defined by years of schooling.  
We conducted a factor analysis of 13 outcome variables, including RELIGION 
and EDUCATION (results not shown). The factor loading of RELIGION on factor 1 is 
0.216, implying that it contributes to factor 1 as expected, but weakly. On the other 
hand, EDUCATION has a factor loading of -0.132 on factor 2, which is a small 
contribution. The other variables show similar factor loadings on both factors 1 and 2. 
Based on these results, we construct new variables PARANORMAL2 and 
NONSCIENTIFIC2. 
We estimate equations (1) through (3) with PARANORMAL2 and 
NONSCIENTIFIC2 on the left-hand side. All of the results in Tables 4 and 5 are 
qualitatively confirmed (results not shown); NONSCIENTIFIC2 becomes more 
significant, and its coefficients become larger, than in the previous estimations. Thus, 
the conclusions in the previous subsections are robust to the inclusion of religion and 
education in the factor analysis by which we define paranormality and nonscientific 
thinking. 
  
4.  Performance of the Homo economicus: An extension 
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Homo economicus is characterized by rationality, perfect intellectual ability, perfect 
selfishness, and perfect self-control. Although we have focused on the effects of 
rationality, it is interesting to ask how the other attributes of Homo economicus affect 
individual performance. In this section, we define proxies for the other aforementioned 
characteristics of Homo economicus, using other answers to our survey questions, and 
we investigate the effects of each characteristic on our performance measures.  
 
4.1 Definitions of variables 
In this subsection, we define the additional variables used in the regression analysis. 
Intellectual ability (ABILITY) 
For intellectual ability, we use subjects’ self-reported school grades at age 15. 
Respondents were asked to choose from a 5-point scale, from 1 (“in the lower rank”) to 
5 (“in the higher rank”). 
Selfishness (SELFISH) 
To measure selfishness, we used the answer to the following survey question: Does the 
following statement hold true for you? “I don’t sit in a priority seat on public 
transportation because I want to offer it to others.” Again, the response is on a 
5-point scale, from 1 (“This is particularly true for me”) to 5 (“This is not true for me at 
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all”). SELFISH is defined by this answer. 
Self-control (SELFCONTROL) 
For the self-control variable, we asked whether the following six statements held true 
for the respondents, on a 5-point scale from 1 (not hold true at all) to 5 (particularly 
true).  
a) Even if I make plans, I end up procrastinating. 
b) I always keep my promises. 
c) When I have something I want, I can’t bear not to buy it. 
d) I always plan carefully before making an action. 
e) No matter how angry I get, I don’t shout at others. 
f) When I am faced with a problem, I usually act before I think. 
SELFCONTROL is defined by the sum of these answers; where appropriate, the signs of 
answers are reversed so as to assign higher values to greater self-control.11 
  Our regression equations are just equations (1) through (3), adding ABILITY, 
SEFLISH, and SELFCONTROL as regressors. Higher values of these variables means 
that subjects are more akin to Homo economicus.  
 
4.2 Estimation results for the extended model 
Estimation results for the extended model are presented in Table 6. In the left-hand 
columns, the results for the extended equation (1) are shown. Paranormality and 
                                                  
11 We also defined two other variables, SC_PLAN, which is defined by the sum of answers to 
the questions a) through d), and SC_FEEL, which is defined by the sum of e) and f). However, 
estimation results using these are not different from those using SELFCONTROL. 
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non-scientific thinking are negative but insignificant, though this may be due to 
collinearity. Gender and age give almost the same impact on income as in the original 
equation (1). ABILITY and SELFCONTROL are positive and significant, while 
SELFISH is not significant; this indicates that those who are generally akin to Homo 
economicus tend to achieve higher incomes.  
In the middle of the table, results for the extended equation (2) are shown. 
Paranormality affect happiness positively, and non-scientific thinking negatively, as in 
Table 5. Thus, the impacts of these variables on happiness are robust. The results for 
gender and age also do not change much. The effects of the other newly-added 
explanatory variables are almost the same as in the income regression. The only 
difference is that SELFISH is now negative and insignificant rather than positive and 
insignificant. The negative sign of the point estimate is consistent with previous studies 
on altruism (Konow and Earley 2008, Phelps 2001). When income is added (extended 
equation (3)), the estimation results are almost unchanged (right-hand columns). 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper investigated the individual-level outcomes of irrationality. Although 
rationality usually brings about higher outcome, if irrationality predominates in society, 
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this may not be the case (DeLong et al. 1990). Thus, it is interesting to examine the 
outcome of irrationality empirically. We used two main concepts of irrationality, 
paranormal beliefs and non-scientific thinking, which were abstracted from eleven 
questions by factor analysis. Although both of these represent irrationality in that they 
contradict facts, factor analysis revealed that they are distinct phenomena.  
This paper adopts two measures of individual performance: income and happiness. 
Although intuition suggests that income is a good measure of economic performance, 
this does not hold true for females in Japan. On the other hand, happiness is a good 
measure of self-evaluated performance, including psychological aspects. 
Empirical results reveal that non-scientific thinking lowers income, while 
paranormality does not. Interestingly enough, non-scientific thinking and paranormality 
affect happiness in opposite directions: the former lowers happiness while the latter 
raises it. As belief in religion is known to raise happiness (Cohen 2002), belief in 
paranormality might act similarly to religiosity.  
We extended our analysis to investigate the effects of various other characteristics 
of Homo economicus. Higher ability and self-control resulted in higher income and 
happiness. Selfishness did not have a significant impact. These results, in general, 
support the idea that Homo economicus achieves higher performance than other 
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subspecies of humanity.  
The present paper has many limitations. First, income does not work well as a 
measure of economic performance for women in Japan. Since we obtained similar 
results for the male-only and total samples, the results for income seem credible. Still, 
finding a good measure for economic performance for females is a goal for the future.  
Second, endogeneity of the regressors may be a problem. The regressors are basic 
traits of human beings, which are probably inherited or determined in childhood, so that 
they should essentially be exogenous to the income and happiness of adults. However, 
we cannot totally deny the possibility that these basic traits are influenced by standard 
of living in adulthood. Since it seems formidable task to find appropriate instrumental 
variables from the questions of our survey, addressing the possible endogeneity problem 
remains as a future work. 
Third, Homo economicus may have basic traits that the present paper overlooked. 
For example, hyperbolic discounting produces time inconsistency and less efficient 
behavior (Laibson 1997), whereas Homo economicus may be characterized by 
exponential discounting. In addition, human beings in the real world cannot be 
homogenous: for example, naïve and sophisticated persons have systematically different 
behavior (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). Thus, analysis of various types of human 
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beings is called for. Given these arguments, the present paper only takes a small step 
toward the study of Homo economicus as a benchmark for human effectiveness. 
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Table 1. Questions on irrationality and descriptive statistics of the answers  
 
Note: Each question asks: “Do you agree with the following idea?” Larger numbers indicate greater paranormality and more 
non-scientific thinking. 
Category Question Name of variables 
Share (%) 
mean 
Standard 
deviation 1 2 3 4 5 
paranormality
Spirits and Ghosts exist. GHOST 15.21 15.33 40.58 20.60 8.27 2.914 1.136 
Heaven exists. HEAVEN 10.40 11.10 48.86 22.08 7.55 3.053 1.023 
God or Gods exist. GOD 9.58 10.55 40.41 28.53 10.93 3.207 1.081 
Life after death exists. AFTERWORLD 14.71 12.96 43.18 20.62 8.53 2.953 1.124 
God knows about all the wrong 
things we've done. 
WRONGDOING 
10.71 12.72 39.70 26.31 10.56 3.133 1.106 
It is possible to move an object 
by using psychokinesis. 
PSYCHOKINESIS 27.90 25.57 38.03 7.04 1.45 2.286 0.995 
I believe in fortune telling. FORTUNETELLING 16.39 19.74 44.48 17.52 1.87 2.687 1.003 
A person's blood type indicates 
their character. 
BLOODTYPE 
12.74 20.03 42.72 23.33 1.17 2.802 0.975 
non-scientific 
thinking 
Human beings evolved from 
other living things. 
EVOLUTION 
18.33 36.64 34.96 6.22 3.84 2.406 0.981 
You should place a greater 
value on thinking with your 
head than with your heart. 
HEADTHANHEART 
5.12 33.52 56.01 4.72 0.62 2.622 0.685 
What is written in science text 
books is true. 
SCIENCETEXT 
5.41 38.65 49.66 5.13 1.15 2.580 0.724 
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Table 2. Rotated factor loadings and uniqueness 
 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Uniqueness 
AFTERWORLD 0.856 0.015 0.265 
GOD 0.809 -0.054 0.349 
HEAVEN 0.802 -0.038 0.360 
GHOST 0.704 0.041 0.498 
WRONGDOING 0.702 -0.090 0.509 
FORTUNETELLING 0.644 0.058 0.577 
PSYCHOKINESIS 0.530 0.149 0.685 
BLOODTYPE 0.427 0.020 0.816 
HEADTHANHEART -0.001 0.502 0.748 
EVOLUTION -0.066 0.362 0.868 
SCIENCETEXT -0.087 0.338 0.883 
 
               Note: Principal factor analysis with promax rotation was applied. 
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Table 3. Causes of paranormality and non-scientific thinking 
 
PARANORMAL NONSCIENTIFIC 
Coef. p value Coef. p value 
Constant 0.214 [0.047]** 0.204 [0.006]*** 
DMAN -0.436 [0.000]*** -0.112 [0.000]*** 
D_AGE20 0.401 [0.000]*** 0.380 [0.000]*** 
D_AGE30 0.440 [0.000]*** 0.255 [0.000]*** 
D_AGE40 0.521 [0.000]*** 0.256 [0.000]*** 
D_AGE50 0.306 [0.000]*** 0.208 [0.000]*** 
D_AGE60 0.075 [0.257] 0.143 [0.002]*** 
EDUCATION_P -0.024 [0.005]*** -0.011 [0.063]* 
LIVING_15 0.051 [0.000]*** 0.004 [0.489] 
ABILITY -0.087 [0.000]*** -0.080 [0.000]*** 
Adjusted R2 0.116 0.044
Number of Observations  3588  3588
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Table 4.  Estimation results for equation (1) 
 
  Coef. p value Coef. p value 
Constant 312.783 [0.000]*** -560.175 [0.000]***
PARANORMAL -40.511 [0.000]*** -6.878 [0.192] 
NONSCIENTIFIC -38.322 [0.000]*** -21.744 [0.004]***
DMAN 327.185 [0.000]***
AGE 31.794 [0.000]***
AGE_SQ -0.328 [0.000]***
Adjusted R2  0.022  0.299 
Number of 
observations 
 3235  3235 
 
Note: Dependent Variable is income. Estimation method is ordinary least squares. 
AGE_SQ is squared age.   
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Table 5.  Estimation results for happiness equations  
Panel A.  Results for equation (2)  
Coef. p value Coef. p value 
PARANORMAL 0.073 [0.000]*** 0.044 [0.014]** 
NONSCIENTIFIC -0.146 [0.000]*** -0.161 [0.000]*** 
DMAN -0.185 [0.000]*** 
AGE -0.0004 [0.969] 
AGE_SQ -0.00002 [0.836] 
Pseudo R2  0.003  0.005 
Number of 
observations 
 3895  3895 
 
Panel B.  Results for equation (3) 
Coef. p value Coef. p value 
PARANORMAL 0.076 [0.000]*** 0.042 [0.038]** 
NONSCIENTIFIC -0.152 [0.000]*** -0.168 [0.000]*** 
INCOME 0.0003 [0.000]*** 0.001 [0.000]*** 
DMAN -0.368 [0.000]*** 
AGE -0.022 [0.038]** 
AGE_SQ 0.0002 [0.064]* 
Pseudo R2  0.005  0.011 
Number of 
observations 
 3211  3211 
 
Note: Dependent variable is HAPPINESS. Estimation method is ordered probit.
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Table 6.  Estimation results for the extended model 
INCOME HAPPINESS 
Coef. p value Coef. p value Coef. p value 
Constant -819.365 [0.000]***
PARANORMAL -1.357 [0.797] 0.060 [0.001]*** 0.056 [0.007]***
NONSCIENTIFIC -8.593 [0.268] -0.083 [0.002]*** -0.099 [0.001]***
DMAN 330.319 [0.000]*** -0.177 [0.000]*** -0.327 [0.000]***
AGE 32.895 [0.000]*** -0.001 [0.957] -0.018 [0.096]* 
AGE__SQ -0.343 [0.000]*** 0.000 [0.655] 0.000 [0.211] 
SELFISH 5.733 [0.202] -0.017 [0.293] -0.025 [0.156] 
ABILITY 44.935 [0.000]*** 0.179 [0.000]*** 0.142 [0.000]***
SELFCONTROL 4.115 [0.014]** 0.043 [0.000]*** 0.040 [0.000]***
INCOME 0.001 [0.000]***
R2 0.324 0.018 0.020 
Number of 
observations  
3144
 
3752
 
3122
 
Note: We show Adjusted R-squared for the income regression, and pseudo R-squared for the happiness regression. 
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Figure 1. Path diagram 
 
Note: Values in the figure are standardized coefficients. e1 to e4 are random terms. 
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